Using Ownership as an Incentive: Does the Too Many Chiefs Rule Apply in Entrepreneurial Firms?

Agency theory is used to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of ownership proliferation on firm performance. We examine the effects of CEO ownership, executive team ownership, and all employee ownership, in addition to the moderating effect of risk, on firm survival and stock price. Firms with low CEO ownership outperform those with high levels of CEO ownership across all levels of risk, but the effect is most pronounced for low risk firms. Executive team ownership is negatively related to firm performance, while ownership for all employees is positively associated with firm performance particularly for higher risk firms

Agency Theory Implications for Strategic Human Resource Management: Effects of CEO Ownership, Administrative HRM, and Incentive Alignment on Firm Performance

Agency theory is used to expand the research in strategic human resource management (SHRM) by viewing the construct underlying SHRM as control over all employees. We develop hypotheses on the effects of CEO ownership, administrative HRM, and incentive stock ownership on firm performance. The results indicate that administrative HRM has a negative effect on stock price. Incentive alignment via stock ownership has a positive effect on stock price and productivity. CEO ownership has a positive effect on sales but a negative impact on productivity. Implications for theory and practice are discussed

The View from the Top: How Strategic Human Resource Management Affects the Performance of Initial Public Offering Firms

We study SHRM by taking an organizational level perspective on control over all employees. Drawing from agency theory, control theory, and the resource-based view of the firm, we develop hypotheses regarding the differential effects on firm performance of various overarching approaches to human resource management (HRM) control implemented in small, growing firms. We test our hypotheses in a longitudinal study of 342 firms that went public in 1993. Results support the negative effect of bureaucratic HRM control on market-based measures of performance, while firm-specific HRM control and incentive-based HRM control are related to internal measures of firm growth

The Human Resource Executive Effect in Initial Public Offering Firms

[Excerpt] There is much discussion about HRM becoming strategic, in part by hiring a senior HR executive. This study explores whether that recommendation can help entrepreneurial, growth-oriented companies. By applying organizational inertia concepts, we study whether having a senior HRM executive, reporting to the CEO, affects firm performance in a sample of initial public offering (IPO) firms. Results indicate that smaller and fast-growth IPOs experience the most gain from having a senior human resource executive

Dermal benefits of topical D-ribose

Our aging skin undergoes changes with reductions in collagenous and elastic fibers, fibroblasts, mast cells, and macrophages with free radical production, which can result in reduced skin tone and wrinkle formation. Fibroblasts are important for dermal integrity and function with a decrease in function producing less skin tone, thinning, and wrinkle formation. Dermal levels of adenosine triphosphate (ATP) decline with aging, potentially altering dermal function. Supplemental D-ribose, a natural occurring carbohydrate, enhances ATP regeneration. D-ribose-based studies demonstrated benefits in both cell culture fibroblastic activities and a subsequent clinical study in women with decreased skin tone with wrinkles. Supplemental D-ribose may offer this needed cellular benefit

Using Ownership as an Incentive

Agency theory is used to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of ownership proliferation on firm performance. The authors examine the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) ownership, executive team ownership, and all employee ownership in addition to the moderating effect of risk on firm survival and stock price. Firms with low CEO ownership outperform those with high levels of CEO ownership across all levels of risk, but the effect is most pronounced for low-risk firms. Executive team ownership is negatively related to firm performance, whereas ownership for all employees is positively associated with firm performance, particularly for higher risk firms.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67316/2/10.1177_1059601199244003.pd

F.A.R.O.G. FORUM, Vol. 5 No. 1

https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/francoamericain_forum/1059/thumbnail.jp

F.A.R.O.G. FORUM, Vol. 5 No. 5

Contains a supplément littéraire.https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/francoamericain_forum/1063/thumbnail.jp

Genetic NMDA Receptor Deficiency Disrupts Acute and Chronic Effects of Cocaine but not Amphetamine

NMDA receptor-mediated glutamate transmission is required for several forms of neuronal plasticity. Its role in the neuronal responses to addictive drugs is an ongoing subject of investigation. We report here that the acute locomotor-stimulating effect of cocaine is absent in NMDA-receptor deficient mice (NR1-KD). In contrast, their acute responses to amphetamine and to direct dopamine receptor agonists are not significantly altered. The striking attenuation of cocaine's acute effects is not likely explained by alterations in the dopaminergic system of NR1-KD mice, since most parameters of pre-and post-synaptic dopamine function are unchanged. Consistent with the behavioral findings, cocaine induces less c-Fos expression in the striatum of these mice, while amphetamine-induced c-Fos expression is intact. NR1-KD mice can become sensitized and display conditioned place preference to cocaine; however, these behaviors are attenuated and develop more slowly in mutant animals. Our results highlight the importance of NMDA receptor-mediated glutamatergic transmission specifically in cocaine actions, and support a hypothesis that cocaine and amphetamine elicit their effects through differential actions on signaling pathways